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COMMENTS ON CAMPAIGN FINANCE
REFORM
Henry Monaghan·

Realistically viewed, the public does not care much about
campaign finance. However, the commentators and politicians
involved with the campaign process care a great deal. Yet, of those
who have expressed any view at all about our topic, few still
believe that the existing distinction between expenditures and
contributions is satisfactory. 1
I agree with Judge Winter's statement that, from the point of
view of the speaker, the distinction between contributions and
expenditures is pretty weak. This is because the choice between the
two is made by a donor, who looks for the most efficient way to
espouse political ideas and pursue her political goals. Accordingly,
in his celebrated Buckley brief, Judge Winter correctly argued that
if we restrict the manner in which a donor may express herself, it
will directly limit the articulation of her political goals. The
distinction between contributions and expenditures is becoming
even more infirm. Most importantly, the distinction does not deal
with the present campaing scheme because it permits both the
operation of PACS 2 and the contribution of so-called "soft
money."

• Harlan Fiske Stone Professor of Constitutional Law, Columbia University
School of Law. LL.B., Yale Law School; LL.M., Harvard Law School.
1
See, e.g., Ralph K. Winter, The History and Theory of Buckley v. Valeo,
6 J.L. & PoL'Y 93 (1997); Burt Neuborne, One Dollar, One Vote?, THE NATION,
Dec. 2, 1996, at 21.
2
PACs are political action committees defined as "any committee, club,
association, or other group of persons which receives contributions aggregating
in excess of $1,000 during a calendar year or which makes expenditures
aggregating in excess of $1,000 during a calendar year." 2 U.S.C. §431(4)(a)
(1997).
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While few will defend the existing process, even fewer
politicians and aspiring politicians seem prepared to enact any
serious change, especially after they have been successfully elected.
Instead, they take to the existing process like fish take to water.
The on-going spotlight on the Clinton and Gore fundraising
activities is a particularly salient example. 3 I believe that the
Clinton/Gore activities have drawn such heavy attention from the
national media for two reasons: first, Mr. Clinton failed to separate
himself from the Democratic National Convention when exposure
began. Second, his continuous moralizing about the need for
meaningful campaign reform attracted significant attention. 4
Suppose, however, that Mr. Clinton had taken a different
approach, the one that he has now embraced. Imagine he said,
"Yes, access to the White House is for sale. I needed to raise funds
for my presidency. After costly midterm election losses, I needed
to amass a considerable war chest to outstage Mr. Newt Gingrich
and his 'Contract on America.' So, I did what any sensible
politician would do, I provided special access and assistance to
persons who would help me out. For some it flattered their egos;

3

Michael Kranish, "Soft Money" Use Draws Critics, But No Probers,

BosroN GLOBE, June 9, 1997, at Al (discussing the extent of the Clinton-Gore
exploitation of loopholes in federal campaign laws).
4
For example, during his 1996 State of the Union address, President Clinton
called on Congress to pass the McCain-Feingold campaign finance reform
legislation "challeng[ing] Congress to curb special interest influence in politics
by passing the first truly bipartisan campaign finance reform proposal in a
generation." Russ Feingold, President Clinton Endorses McCain-Feingold as
Campaign Finance Reform Vehicle, Gov'r PRESS RELEASES by Fed. Document
Clearing House, Jan. 24, 1996, available in 1996 WL 5167139. Additionally, in
his 1994 State of the Union address, Clinton urged Congress "to finish the job
both houses began last year, by passing tough and meaningful campaign finance
reform and lobby reform legislation this year." Fred Wertheimer, Time to
Deliver, Campaign Promisesfor Campaign Finance and Lobby Reform, COMMON
CAUSE, Mar. 22, 1994, at 37. See also Michael Ross, Seven House Democrats
Fault Clinton's Campaign Reform, L.A. TIMES, May 21, 1993, at 18 (referring
to President Clinton's campaign finance reform proposal, a major promise of his
presidential campaign); Viewpoints: House Shouldn't Spook at Campaign
Finance Law, NEWSDAY, Oct. 25, 1993, at 36 (discussing Clinton's vow to sign
a meaningful campaign finance reform measure passed by the House).
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for others it permitted them to make their points known to my
administration. What is wrong with that?"
Now, what is wrong with that? At this juncture, numerous roads
might be explored. One could examine this question in standard
law and economics efficiency terms. Justice Breyer 's plurality
opinion in the recent Colorado Republican Party case draws upon
these law and economics justifications. 5 However, I want to pass
on this inquiry, not only because of time constraints, but because
I believe that other avenues are more fruitful.
Instead, I would like to revisit the terrain, at least in part, that
Burt Neuborne explored. However, I will begin from a very
different set of premises. I reject any theory suggesting that
lobbying is presumptively objectionable. Lobbying requires access
and, in my mind, recurring access cannot be considered objectionable. Political access is like a controlled substance: a prescription
is not only necessary, but it generally requires money. I accept the
proposition that "money talks" and realize that equal access to
money does not exist. 6 I believe that the combination of these
factors, in large part, fuels the present consternation over campaign
finance.
Some suggest the "real concern" is that incumbents will remain
in office forever. 7 Perhaps they will, but will simply reshuffling or
replacing incumbents result in meaningful political change? I do

5

Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n
116 S. Ct. 2309 (1996) (holding that the First Amendment prohibits the
application of the party expenditure limitation of the Federal Election Campaign
Act to expenditures that a political party has made independently, without
coordination with any candidate).
6
See, e.g, James Bennett, Justice Department Seeks Review of Spending
Limits Ban, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 1997, at B9 (asserting that Buckley makes
''bankrolling" a campaign a ''rich man's game"); Burt Neubome, Court's
Decision Has Been Disastrous For Democracy, Sr. LOUIS DISPATCH, Feb. 18,
1997, at 78 (stating that "in effect, the Buckley Court ruled that 'money talks'"
and since all Americans do not have the wealth to donate to the political system,
''big money talks so loudly that it drowns out the voices of average Americans").
1
See Fred Wertheimer & Susan Weiss Manes, Campaign Finance Reform:
A Key to Restoring the Health of Our Democracy, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 1126,
1152 (1994) (arguing that the only way to pierce the protection scheme for
incumbents is through campaign finance reform).
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not understand what is wrong with the status quo, or why someone
who presumptively thinks the status quo is the appropriate base line
is put on the defensive?
What fuels the base line controversy is the assumption that the
present system is structured so that the "under classes" or "outsiders" do not have adequate access. I do not want to repeat the
thoughts of Judge Winter and Professor Blasi on the difficulties of
equal access theories when applied in the First Amendment context.
Assuming, however, that the "under classes" or "minority groups"
do not receive equal access, what is the significance for the legal
system? For a moment, I ask you to put the Constitution aside.
What would the word "adequate" mean if campaign financing is
restructured to ensure adequate access for all?
The concern over equal access is understandable, but it is an
unworkable ideal. Equal access is tied to a far more pervasive
concern-the nature of our representative democracy. Professor
Neubome expresses dismay at the fact that so few contribute to
campaigns: Should he? Why does the fact that most Americans do
not contribute to political campaigns mean anything? Perhaps it
means that people are working hard to make ends meet and do not
have much to contribute. It is puzzling, so I look forward to
hearing more on the subject from Professor Neubome, in addition
to hearing his ideas pertaining to what constitutes the fundamental
baseline by which a representative democracy is judged.
My colleague, Professor Blasi, on the other hand, prefers to
address this issue in reference to James Madison and his contemporaries. 8 These historic figures believed in representative, as
opposed to direct, democracy. But they did believe that representatives must act, ultimately, for the public good. They had some
conception of what we call "interest group politics"; "factions" was
Madison's label. 9 It is, however, safe to say that they did not
foresee the dynamics of modem interest group politics, with
numerous competing and conflicting interest groups. They certainly
8

See Vincent A. Blasi, Campaign Finance: Spending Limits and Candidates' Time, 6 J.L. & PoL'Y 123 (1997).
9
JACK N. RAK.OVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE
MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 49-52, 54-55, 67, 190, 199, 280, 316, 346
(1996).
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had no conception of an America in which billions of dollars tum
on the outcome of national legislation.
Madison and company lived in a far simpler world. Their views
were deeply rooted in what Gordon, Wood and others have
characterized as "deference" politics. Ultimate power rested with
the people, but the people were governed by "the wise and the
good." Madison believed that every society had groups that would
seek to oppress others. 10 He thought that the fundamental division
in America was between the "haves" and the "have nots." For
Madison, the fundamental purpose of our Constitutional order was
to protect those who owned property from those who did not. 11
When I speak of property, I do not mean the expansive fortunes of
today, such as General Motors' wealth. In early America, George
Washington was the richest man in the country and his worth was
estimated to be about $1 million.
Protecting the "haves" from the "have nots" is not the goal of
those who, like Professor Neubome, want to reform present day
campaign financing. Far from that goal, they are concerned with
the lot of those who could be called the "losers" in our society.
However, one part of the Madisonian legacy certainly lives on
as the apostolic tradition, that is, that the representatives of the
people act for the common good. Thus we have the term "commonwealth," drawn from prior English history. 12 But, it is becoming
increasingly difficult to discern what is the common good. The
realities of complex group politics, huge accumulations of money
and modem technology have created a landscape that would be
unrecognizable to Madison and his comrades.
My colleague, Professor Blasi, emphasized that the Madisonian
model had a component that has been overlooked, namely, that
adequate representation requires representatives have adequate
time. 13 Time is necessary for allowing representatives to consult
with their constituents and deliberate on what the public interest
requires. Furthermore, time is a far more pressing concern now
10

Id. at 44-45, 332-35.
Id. at314-15.
12
William J. Novak, Common Regulation: Legal Origins of State Power in
America, 45 HA.sTINGS L.J. 1062, 1082 (1994).
13
See Blasi, supra note 8.
11
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then it was in 1789, when the national government was small and
inactive by today's standards.
When considering whether to restructure campaign financing,
should adequate time be a factor as Mr. Blasi implies? Undoubtedly, representatives spend a good deal of their time raising money,
but it is unclear what they would be doing if they were freed from
that burden. More importantly, fundraising does not necessarily
overburden the candidates' time because today they have administrative staffing unknown to the founding generation. Even if time
is being sacrificed, to what extent should concerns about representatives' time carry significant normative weight? Indeed, Professor
Blasi 's thesis suggests that there should be no limit on the size of
contributions. After all, large contributions would save a large
amount of time.
This brings me back to the question of reform. The present
campaign finance rules remind me of a vessel out to sea, a ship
christened "campaign finance money." Aboard the ship are our
politicians and aspiring politicians. However, the ship has many
leaks. These leaks allow huge sums of money to pour on board.
Should the ship be scuttled?
I doubt we will see radical reform because most incumbents
love their leaky little ships. In my opinion, the only realistic
question is whether we should impose spending limits rather than
leaving the system in its present form. In response to this question,
the present Supreme Court is not likely to permit spending limits.
Based upon my reading of the Court's decisions, I do not believe
it is likely that it will endorse such limits, despite Mr. Blasi's timesaving rationales. Accordingly, I do not expect to see Buckley v.
Valeo 14 overthrown.
Instead, we have to ask ourselves whether we want a constitutional amendment that would permit spending limits? Such an
amendment is pending in Congress, and it has been endorsed, at
least nominally by the democratic leadership of both houses. 15
14

424 U.S. 1 (1976).
In 1997, the House of Representatives Minority Leader, Richard Gephardt,
introduced a proposed amendment to the Constitution which would authorize
Congress and the states to impose "reasonable regulations" on expenses and
contributions intended to "influence" the outcome of state and federal elections.
15
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But, what about its merits? Those who advocate in support of
spending limits, believe they will somehow help our system of
representative democracy. I do not share this belief. In fact, I
would be surprised if limits helped, as long as we continue to count
on our PAC expenditures and soft money. Perhaps we should
reform in the opposite direction and embrace the whole hearted
laissez-faire system advocated by Judge Winter.
This discussion leads us at last to the ultimate question, ''why
bother?" From an incumbent's point of view, the present system
is not that far removed from Judge Winter's ideal laissez-faire
world. However, explicit reform along this line does have one
advantage-it would induce candor into the system. In our
contemporary scene, candor is certainly no small value.

H.R.J. Res. 47, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (1997).

